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McCormick: Gender, Family, and Work

GENDER, FAMILY, AND WORK
By MarciaL. McCormick*
I. INTRODUCTION

We have prohibited sex discrimination for a relatively short period
of time. By statute, sex discrimination in pay was prohibited in 1963,1
and in other employment contexts in 1964.2 The Supreme Court, not too
much later, began to rule in a series of decisions that at least some sexbased decisions violated the Equal Protection Clause.3 As this relatively
short history might suggest, the story of sex discrimination is
complicated. Like race, sex is viewed as an immutable characteristic,
often irrelevant to questions of ability or desert.4 Unlike race, however,
sex differences are more often seen as legitimately based in biology, or
in social norms that are not themselves problematic, and those
differences have justified treating people differently.
The conventional story on sex in Title VII is that it was added by a
Southern Democrat as a way to defeat the bill.6 Who would vote to give

* Associate Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. I would like to thank Hayley
Collins, Chalana Scales-Ferguson, and John Bowen for excellent research assistance. Thanks also to
Nicole Buonocore Porter, Nancy Levit, Ann McGinley, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Wendy Green,
Deborah Widiss, and Marcy Karin for helpful discussions on equality, difference, and policy
choices. Finally, thanks to the editors of the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal for their
diligent work and excellent editing suggestions. Errors that remain are mine.
1. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006)).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006)); see also Federal Laws Prohibiting Job Discrimination
Questions
and
Answers,
U.S.
EQUAL
EMP'T
OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html (last modified Nov. 21, 2009).
3. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 680 n.5 (1973) ("[W]hile the Fifth
Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is 'so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process"'); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
4. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686
5. See, e.g., Mark Thompson, Women in Combat? Not So Fast, This Female Officer Says,
TIME (July 5, 2012), http://nation.time.com/2012/07/05/women-in-combat-not-so-fast-this-femaleofficer-says/.
6. See 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964) (containing comments suspicious of the sponsor's
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rights to African Americans if it meant giving rights to women, too?
That story has been debunked to some extent by historians,' but the story
and its resonance tells us something important about our ambivalence
towards sex discrimination.
Our definition of sex is part of the problem. Every year that I teach
employment discrimination, I ask my students the question, "What is
sex?" As you might guess, many answer that sex is a genetic difference
that causes certain biological differences. Many focus only on sex
differences related to human reproduction, although the conversation
tends to move into additional generalities about men in the aggregate
and women in the aggregate, like differences in upper body strength,
speed, or endurance. Eventually, the conversation moves into the
territory of other behaviors that are often sex-linked if not biologically
determined. When we go back to talking about the cases and whether
particular employer decisions are discrimination after this discussion, the
conversation becomes very complicated. In the abstract, the students
agree that men and women should not be treated differently in
employment. But where men and women are viewed as different,
regardless of the reason for that difference, the question of whether their
different treatment is the kind of discrimination we should prohibit
becomes more difficult to agree on.
My students are no different from the rest of American society, and
society's attitudes have not changed much in the last thirty years. You
can see it most clearly with issues like pregnancy, birth, caregiving, and
what counts as sex discrimination in connection with them.8 These are
reason for the amendment); see also William H. Chafe, The Road to Equality: 1962-Today, in No
SMALL COURAGE: A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 529, 547 (Nancy F. Cott ed.,
2000); JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 233-34
(1991); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT To WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE
UNITED STATES 314 (1982).
7. MARY FRANCES BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED: POLITICS, WOMEN's RIGHTS, AND THE
AMENDING PROCESS OF THE CONSTITUTION 61 (1986) (describing Representative Martha Griffiths'

(D.-Mich.) efforts to garner support to include sex in Title VII, which included having Congressman
Smith introduce the bill); see also ROSALIND ROSENBERG, DIVIDED LIVES: AMERICAN WOMEN IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 187-88 (2008). Representative Griffiths and Senator Margaret Chase
Smith successfully defeated an effort in committee to remove sex from the list of statuses protected
by Title VII. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 6, at 314. For his part, the sponsor of the amendment
denied that his motive for it was to defeat the bill. HOFF, supra note 6, at 233. Notwithstanding this
evidence of support, less than a majority of the House actually voted for the amendment to add sex
to Title VII. Id. at 233-34.
8. See, e.g., Judith L. Lichtman, Written Testimony at the EEOC Meeting on Unlawful
Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers and Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities (Feb. 15,
2012), available at http://wwwl.eeoc.gov//eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/lichtman.cfin?renderforprint-l
(discussing continued discrimination against working women based on pregnancy and caregiver
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areas in which women and men are differently situated. Women get
pregnant, men do not. Women breastfeed babies, men do not. And even
though it may not be biologically driven, the vast majority of caregivers
of children or adults who cannot care for themselves are women.9
Whether the difference is based on biology or cultural factors, men and
women are differently situated when it comes to pregnancy, birth, and
caregiving. Figuring out what equality looks like when people are
different is a project with which we continue to struggle.
No status is bounded by bright lines or as capable of scientific
identification as we might think. It is surprisingly difficult to identify
what "sex" means. Even scientists debate whether "sex" encompasses
only the biological differences that are true for all or nearly all women,
or also differences in behavior that are believed to be linked to sex.1o
This poses real problems for our conceptions of equality. The norm
against discrimination in the United States embodies formal equality,
first and foremost, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, and,
generally, as a matter of legislative policy and statutory interpretation.
As a result, even so-called benign classifications, classifications at least
nominally aimed at benefitting social groups historically oppressed, have
been struck down as violating the Constitution.' 2 Our equality norm
status despite the legal protections that have been in place since 1964).
9. See Fact Sheet: Women and Caregiving: Facts and Figures,Family Caregiver Alliance,
http://www.caregiver.org/caregiver/jsp/content node.jsp?nodeid=892 (last visited May 13, 2013).
10. Compare LOUANN BRIZENDINE, THE FEMALE BRAIN 8 (2006) (arguing that the different
behaviors of women and men are linked to neurological differences), with CORDELIA FINE,
DELUSIONS OF GENDER: How OUR MINDS, SOCIETY, AND NEUROSEXISM CREATE DIFFERENCE, at

xxiv-xxv (2010) (pointing out the weaknesses in research linking behavior to neurological
differences and arguing that researchers' biases make them construct findings to support those
differences), and REBECCA M. JORDAN-YOUNG, BRAIN STORM: THE FLAWS IN THE SCIENCE OF SEX
DIFFERENCES, at xii-xiii (2010).

11. Compare Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681-82, (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring),
with id. at 2689-90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The majority in Ricci uses formal equality principles
to hold that consideration of the racial impact of a test was race discrimination. Id. at 2664. Justice
Scalia's concurrence suggests that a statute that requires the government to provide substantive
equality or equality of results may violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 2682. Justice
Ginsberg's dissent puts the city's actions in the context of a long history of race discrimination,
promoting the city's actions as necessary for substantive equality. Id. at 2690. See also Rachel F.
Moran, Rethinking Race, Equality and Liberty: The Unfulfilled Promise of Parents Involved, 69
Ohio St. L.J. 1321 (2008) (discussing color-blind and color-conscious approaches by the Supreme
Court); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
ConstitutionalStruggles over Brown, I17 HARV. L. REv. 1470, 1473 (2004); J. Harvie Wilkinson
III, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional
Equality, 61 Va. L. Rev. 945, 946 (1975) (arguing that the Court should promote political equality
and equality of opportunity, but refrain from promoting economic equality).
12. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505-08 (1989) (applying strict
scrutiny to a program that the government asserted was designed to benefit racial minorities, and
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does not help us define equity among difference very well.
This Article for the thirtieth volume of the Hofstra Labor &
Employment Law Journal looks at the last thirty years of discrimination
law as it relates to issues of pregnancy, birth, and caregiving. Part II
traces the legal developments over this time period and a bit beyond, and
Part III summarizes the most recent developments and current debates.
Part IV concludes and looks ahead. We are on the cusp of what could be
real change in gender roles and work, but there remain tensions in
gender roles alone and also linked with class and race that could hold us
back.
II. EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCE: A LOOK BACK

The 1960s and 1970s saw women activists focusing their energies
and achieving victories in obtaining greater access for women to
positions they had been excluded from, formally or by custom. 3 This
time period saw activists focused on formal equality, autonomy, choice,
and removing barriers to women where men and women were similarly
situated.14 That approach yielded quite a few victories in the courts, but
striking the program down on the ground that remedying historical societal discrimination was not,
by itself, a compelling governmental interest); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
720-21, 733 (1982) (striking down the exclusion of men from a nursing program argued to be a way
to increase opportunities for women). Of course, the policies at issue in those cases may not
actually have benefitted people of color or women, at least in some senses. Even if they did, there
may have been significant costs imposed as well. The policy barring men from the Mississippi
University for Women's nursing program, for example, may have served to promote sex segregation
in the health services fields, segregation that generally results in lower pay for jobs dominated by
women. In addition, yet another so-called benign classification was struck down in the Title VII
context. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (striking down a fetal protection
policy that affected only women as a violation of Title VII). The fetal protection policy at issue in
Johnson Controls "protected" women who could not prove they were infertile from higher paying
jobs that exposed them to higher levels of lead, on the ground that the exposure ran the risk of injury
fto fetuses the women might be carrying. Id at 190-92. The policy did not allow men to opt out of
those jobs despite the link between male exposure to lead and health risks to fetuses fathered. Id. at
197. The ban on women serving in ground combat positions in the military seems to present a
similar kind of "benefit." Women are protected from some kinds of casualties, but their ability to
advance within the military is limited. See R. Cort Kirkwood, Women in Combat: War For and
Against
Women,
THE
NEW
AMERICAN
(Apr.
12,
2013,
6:00
PM),
http://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/item/15012-women-in-combat-war-for-and-againstwomen. Of course, if the reason for the ban is not the danger to the women themselves, but instead
the danger that male troops would face because they would risk more to be chivalrous to protect
their sisters-in-arms, then maybe the policy would not be considered a "benign" classification.
13. Barbara Ann White, Foreword: Traversing 2nd and 3rd Waves: Feminist Legal Theory
Moving Forward, 39 U. Balt. L.F. i, iv (2008).
14. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 19-20 (1999).
See generally ALISON M. JAGGER, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983) (analyzing the
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activists learned an important lesson about its limitations in the mid1970s in a series of cases about pregnant workers.
A. The Early Years and the Supreme Court's PregnancyCases
In Geduldig v. Aiello, 5 the Supreme Court considered whether a
California disability insurance plan for state employees violated the
Equal Protection Clause when it denied disability benefits for time away
from work for normal pregnancy and delivery. 6 The Court used rational
basis review to determine that the state made a defensible choice to not
provide these benefits as a way to keep the contribution limits affordable
for all employees.' 7 In reaching the conclusion that rational basis was
the test to apply, the Court noted,
These policies provide an objective and wholly noninvidious basis for
the State's decision not to create a more comprehensive insurance
program than it has. There is no evidence in the record that the
selection of the risks insured by the program worked to discriminate
against any definable group or class in terms of the aggregate risk
protection derived by that group or class from the program. There is no
risk from which men are protected and women are not. Likewise,
there is no risk from which women are protected and men are not.
In footnotes, the Court distinguished this case from the state
policies found unconstitutional in Reed v. Reed 9 and Frontiero v.
Richardson,20 reasoning that those cases had involved "discrimination
based upon gender as such."21 Discrimination on the basis of pregnancy
was not itself gender,
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such
under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory
analysis. The program divides potential recipients into two groupspregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is
exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes. The
feminist political theories of the sixties and seventies and their relations to contemporary politics
and human nature).
15. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
16. Id. at 486-90.

17.

Id. at 496.

18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 496-97 (footnotes omitted).
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
Geduldig,417 U.S. at 496 n.20.
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fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program thus accrue to members of
both sexes.22
In other words, because the distinction did not map perfectly onto
sex-those who are pregnant at any point in time are only women, but
those not pregnant are both women and men-the distinction was not sex
discrimination.
The result in this case had been something of a surprise, and not
24
only because of the Court's prior decisions in Reed23 and Frontiero.
Earlier in the same term as Geduldig, the Court had held that a policy
requiring teachers to take mandatory unpaid maternity leave as soon as
their pregnancy began showing was unconstitutional.25 The Court had
relied on the Due Process Clause's right to privacy rather than the Equal
Protection Clause,26 but the appellees' brief in Geduldig tied that
decision to an exploration of how pregnancy-based distinctions operated
as "part of a continuum of discrimination" on the basis of sex.27
Interestingly, the State of California framed its reply in terms of sex
equality as well, arguing that "[a]ppellees do a disservice to women
when they make pregnancy the sine qua non of being woman. Surely it
is common observation that a large part of woman's struggle for equality
involves gaining social acceptance for roles alternative to childbearing
and childrearing. .. *."28

At the time that Geduldig was decided, another case was winding

22. Id.
23. 404 U.S. 71 (holding that a statute preferring males over females when deciding between
two equally suited individuals to administer a will was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
24. 411 U.S. 677 (holding that different treatment for the spouses of male and female
uniformed service members constituted a violation of the Due Process Clause).
25. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
26. Id. at 639-40, 647-48, 651. The lower courts had used an equal protection rationale
instead, and had split on whether the leave policy discriminated on the basis of sex. LaFleur v.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972) (holding that the policy constituted a
classification on the basis of sex and finding no valid state purpose in the kind of mandatory leave at
issue); La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (using rational
basis and finding no violation of equal protection); see also LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 651 (Powell, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that Equal Protection doctrine was a better fit for this analysis); id. at 657
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (suggesting that rooting rights in substantive due process has no clear
boundaries).
27. Brief for Appellees at 37, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (No. 73-650). That
brief also made an argument that the state's rule burdened the fundamental right to privacy in
matters of marriage and family. Id. at 53. The appellees' position was supported by amicus briefs
from the EEOC, the AFL-CIO, the International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers,
and the ACLU, Center for Constitutional Rights, and National Organization of Women.
28. Reply Brief for Appellant at 2, Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484 (No. 73-640). However, this
statement was in the context of the rights of childless women to equality. Id.
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its way through the court system, this one involving General, Electric, a
private employer, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.29 When
the Supreme Court considered whether refusing to cover pregnancy
under a disability policy was discrimination on the basis of sex under
Title VII, it applied Geduldig and held that pregnancy discrimination
was not sex discrimination.30 The Court went even further, however.
Title VII bars not just decisions motivated by an employee's protected
class, but also practices that are neutral on their face but cause
discriminatory effects. 3 1 The Court held that excluding pregnancy from
disability insurance coverage did not cause a disparate impact on the
basis of sex.32 The Court reasoned that men and women were covered
for the same risks, while "pregnancy-related disabilities constitute an
additionalrisk, unique to women, and the failure to compensate them for
this risk does not destroy the presumed parity of the benefits, accruing to
men and women alike, which results from the facially evenhanded
inclusion of risks."3 3
In coming to this conclusion, the Court rejected a regulation by the
EEOC that had provided that temporary absences suffered in connection
with a pregnancy or recovery from an event ending a pregnancy should
be treated the same by an employer as any other temporary disability.34
Because Congress had not given the EEOC the power to promulgate
rules under Title VII, the Court held that its regulations were potentially
persuasive evidence of the meaning of Title VII, but not entitled
substantial deference.
In the end, the Court was not persuaded. The
EEOC's regulation was promulgated in 1972, eight years after Title VII
was originally enacted, and contradicted the original position taken by
29. Gen. Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 132-33 (1976). General Electric had filed
amicus briefs in Geduldig, as well. Brief for General Electric Co., as Amicus Curiae, in Support of
the Jurisdictional Statement, Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484 (No. 73-640); Brief for General Electric Co.,
as Amicus Curiae, Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484 (No. 73-640),
30. Gen. Electric,429 U.S. at 134-36.
31. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,428,436 (1971).
32. See Gen. Electric Co., 429 U.S. at 136-38.
33. Id. at 139 (emphasis in original). Arguably, this reasoning misunderstands what disparate
impact discrimination prohibits, but the Supreme Court has not always supported this theory of
discrimination. Melissa Hart, From Wards Cove to Ricci: Struggling Against the "Built-in
Headwinds" of a Skeptical Court, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 261, 261 (2011); Marcia L.
McCormick, Disparate Impact and Equal Protection After Ricci v. DeStefano, 27 Wis. J. L.
GENDER & SOC'Y 100, 103, 124 (2012); Charles A. Sullivan, DisparateImpact: Looking Past the
Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 911, 953, 958-61 (2005); Charles A. Sullivan,
Ricci v. DeStefano: End of the Line or Just Another Turn on the DisparateImpact Road?, 104 Nw.
U. L. REv. 411, 415 (2010).
34. Gen. Electric Co., 429 at 140-41 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975)).
35. Id. at 141-42 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
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the EEOC's General Counsel.3 6 The Court also interpreted the
regulation as in conflict with one promulgated by the Wage and Hour
Administrator of the Department of Labor under the Equal Pay Act. 37
B. The PregnancyDiscriminationAct
In response to the Court's decision, Congress enacted the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), adding the following clarification
in the definition section of Title VII:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for
all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under
fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in
their ability or inability to work, and nothing in Lsection 703(h)] of this
title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise .
The amendment was interpreted not just to clarify what Title VII
required, but to wholly reject the definition of discrimination and the
reasoning that the Court had used in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.39

36. Id. at 142-43. The prohibition on sex discrimination did not start as a priority for the
EEOC. See Herman Edelsberg, Exec. Dir., Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, Statement at the
New York University Annual Conference on Labor (Aug. 25, 1966), in 62 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA)
253-55 (1966) (calling inclusion of sex a "fluke," referring to it as "conceived out of wedlock" and
viewing men as entitled to female secretaries). Conversely, in 1972, Congress enacted the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)), which gave the EEOC the power to bring suits against employers. The
legislative history for that statute contained significant amounts of testimony and information about
sex discrimination. See ROSENBERG, supra note 7, at 188. It appears, however, that no one
highlighted that legislative history to the Court, or if they did that the Court found it a reliable
indicator of what Congress had meant in 1964. See Gen. Electric Co., 429 U.S. at 145 (remarking
that the 1972 guidance "contain[ed] no suggestion that some new source of legislative history had
been discovered in the intervening eight years").
37. Gen. ElectricCo., 429 U.S. at 144-45.
38. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)).
39. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676-79
(1983). Congress may have disagreed with the Court's approach in Geduldigv. Aiello, although the
Court framed the issue as a belief that Title VII's prohibition of discrimination was not
"coterminous" with that of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 677 (citing Gen. Electric Co., 429
U.S. at 154 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). In any event, because Geduldig involved interpretation of
the Constitution, Congress's views cannot control. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997) (holding that Congress cannot enlarge constitutional rights once the Court has defined them).
Justice Rehnquist disagreed that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act could be read to have overruled
the Court's entire approach and charged the majority with doing just that in its opinion without
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In the Court's view, Congress had made clear that it had intended all
along that making a distinction on the basis of pregnancy would be
considered discrimination on the basis of sex. 40 Accordingly, the Court
held that an employer's health insurance policy could not provide less
pregnancy-related coverage for dependents of employees than it did for
other conditions that required hospitalization. 4 1 To do so was
discriminating against male employees on the basis of sex.42 Female
employees were insured against all common risks related to the health of
their spouses, while male employees were not insured against one of the
most common risks related to health of their spouses. 43 The amendment
was also interpreted to allow employers to treat pregnant women more
favorably than men or women unable to work for other reasons," but
employers could not substitute paternal views of what was best for
women in situations where women could make their own choices. 45
C. Post-PDA, Post-ERA

The 1970s, as a whole, saw a big push by activists to effect a vision
of equality that accounted for ways in which women's lives were
different from men's. For example, Congress passed the Patsy T. Mink
Equal Opportunity in Education Act in 1972.46 Popularly known as Title
IX, the Act prohibits recipients of federal funds from discriminating,
including in employment, on the basis of sex. 47 Title IX has been
interpreted very broadly to encourage girls and women to engage in
activities traditionally associated with boys and men; it has not operated

explicitly saying so. See Newport News, 462 U.S. at 686 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice
Rehnquist would have found that the amendment only protected female employees who became
pregnant and did not affect male employees at all. Id. at 688-89. The Court has since appeared to
validate Justice Rehnquist's view and reject the majority's claim that the PDA was Congress's way
of saying what Title VII required all along. See AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 708-13
(2009); see id at 717-23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
40. See Newport News, 462 U.S. at 681.
41. See id at 682-83.
42. Id. at 683.
43. Id. at 683-84.
44. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285-86 (1987).
45. See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (holding that a policy
which prohibited fertile women but not fertile men from certain jobs with high exposures to lead a
violation of Title VII as amended by the PDA and that the goal of fetal protection did not make sex
a bona fide occupational qualification for those jobs).
46. Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688
(2006)).
47. 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
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solely as a traditional antidiscrimination provision.48 Additionally, the
seventies saw the passing of legislation promoting education and
research to benefit women and girls, encouraging women to enter
nontraditional fields, and prohibiting discrimination in credit.49
That legislative push began to tail off shortly after the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act was passed. Congress had finally passed the Equal
Rights Amendment in 1972 and ratification by the states was in
progress,so but that process stalled three states shy of the number needed
in 1977." Even if the ERA had been ratified, however, it is not clear
that it would have been interpreted any differently when applied to
issues in which men and women were not similarly situated because its
operative language used the term "sex," which Geduldig held not to
encompass pregnancy for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 2
Despite the waning support for an expansion of the equality norm,
in the early 1980s, activists continued to push for changes to address
situations in which women were, at least as a social matter, not like men.
For example, Congress began considering broad legislation to provide
economic support to women.54 These Economic Equity Act provisions
would have eliminated sex distinctions in many contexts, including
benefits for members of the armed services; restructured several
programs to make marital status irrelevant or to benefit spouses equally
regardless of sex; restructured the tax code to recognize the contributions
48. See Deborah Brake, The Strugglefor Sex Equality in Sport and the Theory Behind Title
IX, 34 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 13, 15, 18-19 (2001).
49. See Women's Educational Equity Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484, 554
(1974); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500 (1974).
50. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong. (1972).
51. Marcia L. McCormick, Consensus, Dissensus, and Enforcement: Legal Protection of
Working Women from the Time of the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire to Today, 14 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 645, 668 n.123 (2011).
52. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974). Of course, the word "sex" does not appear
in Title VII, but the Equal Protection Clause has been interpreted to prohibit some discrimination on
the basis of sex, and that was the operative language the Court gave Title VII, just as if that
language did appear there. See, e.g., Gen. Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The ERA
provided that "[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged ... on account of
sex." H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong. (1972). It is possible that the "equality of rights" language could
have been interpreted to provide more substantive equality where women and men were not similar,
but that conclusion is not clear.
53. Some of the credit for eroding this support must go to Phyllis Schlafly's group STOP
ERA, which advocated for traditional values and gender roles. HOFF, supra note 6, at 321-25
(describing Schlafly's group); see SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST
AMERICAN WOMEN 232-35 (1991) (crediting the rise of the New Right to passage of the ERA in
1972 and the recognition of a fundamental right to abortion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
54. Economic Equity Act, H.R. 3117, 97th Cong. (1st Sess. 1981); Economic Equity Act, S.
888, 97th Cong. (1st Sess. 1981).
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of homemakers; supported child care programs; and prohibited
discrimination in insurance.5 That legislation did not pass, but it did
form the basis for child support and pension legislation that was enacted
later in that decade.
D. Family and MedicalLeave
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, efforts to address sex-linked
social inequities enjoyed a resurgence, with efforts to pass
comprehensive family leave legislation. Some employees had access to
family leave at this time through union contracts, employer policies, or
state statutes, but the leave tended to be only for mothers and tended to
cover only the period of recuperation from birth. 7 Perhaps because of
the lessons learned in the 1970s, activists framed such family focused
legislation in terms specifically designed to allow flexibility but provide
the same kinds of leave to both sexes.58 In 1984, the Women's Legal
Defense Fund drafted the Family and Medical Leave Act to give
workers a period of unpaid leave from work to care for family or
personal medical needs regardless of the sex of the worker. It was first
introduced in Congress in 1985.60 The House voted it out of committee,

55. See H.R. 3117; S. 888. Summaries of the proposed Act can be found at H.R. 3117
(9 7th):
Economic
Equity
Act,
GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/97/hr3117#summary/libraryofcongress (last visited May 14,
2013),
and
S.
888
(97th):
Economic
Equity
Act,
GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/97/s888#summary/libraryofcongress (last visited May 14,
2013).
56. See HOFF, supra note 6, at 273-74, app. at 402; see also Child Support Enforcement
Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, § 466, 98 Stat. 1305, 1306 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 666
(2006)) (requiring states to strengthen their support laws, to enact guidelines for the appropriate
amount of support, and provide greater assistance to collect that support, providing grants to
improve interstate enforcement of child support orders); Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-397, § 102, 98 Stat. 1426, 1429 (1984) (amending the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act and the Internal Revenue Code to ensure that women who took time off of the workforce for
childrearing and surviving and divorced spouses were treated more equitably by the retirement plan
of their own employer or their former spouses' employer).
57. See Donna R. Lennhoff, Att'y, Family and Medical Leave in the United States: Historical
and
Political
Reflections
3
(Oct.
1,
2004),
available
at
http://www.hhh.umn.edulcenters/wpp/afterbirth/pdf/lenhoff.pdf
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Parental and Disability Leave Act of 1985, H.R. 2020, 99th Cong. (1986); 131 CONG.
REc. S8318 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1985) (statement of Rep. Patricia Schroeder); Donna R. Lennhoff &
Claudia Withers, Implementation of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Toward a Family Friendly
Workplace, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 39, 58 (1994).
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but Congress adjourned before the bill could be voted on.61 The
legislative drives continued through two vetoes by President Bush until
President Clinton finally signed it into law in 1993 as the Family and
Medical Leave Act.62
The Act required that large employers63 afford their employees up
to twelve weeks of unpaid leave to care for a new child, a parent, child,
or spouse with a serious medical issue, or themselves for their own
serious medical issue. 4 The leave would be available to both men and
women in recognition of the fact that many families are headed by single
parents, in the majority of two-parent families parents of both sexes
work, more families are caring for aging relatives, the bulk of caregiving
responsibility traditionally falls to women which reinforces employer
and employee decisions that injure women economically, and both men
and women experience serious medical emergencies. 65 Benefits accrued
before the leave was taken could not be affected, employees would keep
their health insurance benefits while on leave, and employees had to be
restored to their prior position or one equivalent in material respects.6 6
To further protect the right to leave and encourage employees to take it,
employees were protected from retaliation and interference with their
efforts to take leave. The Secretary of Labor was given the power to
investigate employer compliance, and the Secretary and employees were
provided with causes of action to enforce employee rights to be free
from retaliation or interference with leave in federal or state court.68
The Act also created a bipartisan commission, The Commission on
Leave, to review family and medical leave issues.69 The Commission on
Leave issued its report, A Workable Balance: Report to Congress on

61.

Lennhoff & Withers, supra note 60, at 59.

62. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006); Lennhoff& Withers, supra note 60, at 40.
63. Covered private-sector employers were those with an average of fifty or more employees
for at least 20 weeks of the year within a seventy-five mile radius of any particular worksite. 29
U.S.C. §§ 2611(2)(B)(ii), (4)(A)(i).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 2612.

65.
66.

Lennhoff & Withers, supra note 60, at 48-51; 29 U.S.C. §2601.
§ 2614.
§ 2615. The statute sets these rights out in separate subsections, suggesting that they are

67.
slightly different things, paralleling the interference language to section 8(a)(1) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006). See Martin H. Malin, Interference with the
Right to Leave Under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 7 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 329, 358,
374 (2003) (arguing that retaliation and interference use different standards and that the broader
protection against interference could be used to combat sex role stereotypes).
68. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2616-2617.
69. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2631-2636.
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Family and Medical Leave Policies, in 1996.70 That report revealed that
just under half of private sector workers had access to FMLA leave, and
employers not covered by the FMLA provided less family or medical
leave and at relatively lower rates.7 1 Covered employers reported few
administrative burdens or increased costs and no noticeable effect on
72
productivity, profitability, or growth of business.
The report also
described who was taking the leave and for what reasons: only about
16.8% took leave for a reason covered by the FMLA, 3.4% needed it but
did not take it, and 40% anticipated needing to take leave in the
following five years. The majority of employees who took leave for a
reason covered by the FMLA took it because of their own serious health
needs, and the median length of time taken was ten days. More than
half of those who took leave were able to do so with full or partial
payment under their employer's sick, vacation, or disability pay
policies.7 ' The Department of Labor followed up with a survey in 2000,
the findings of which were substantially similar. In April of 2011, the
Department of Labor issued a request for comments on its proposal to
conduct a new survey.
In addition to the survey to track how leave was being used, the
Department of Labor has examined how effective and how onerous on
businesses its administration of the law has been. In its examination in
70. U.S. COMM'N ON FAMILY & MED. LEAVE, A WORKABLE BALANCE: REPORT TO
POLICIES
(1996),
available at
ON
FAMILY
AND
MEDICAL
LEAVE
CONGRESS

http://digitalcommons.ilr.comell.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=-key workplace.
71. See id. at xvi.
72. Id. at xvii-xviii.
73. Id. at xix. Only about 1% of workers total designated their leave as "FMLA leave." Id.
Of those who did not take the leave but needed it, most cited the inability to afford to take leave that
was unpaid. Id.
74. Id. at xx.
75. Id. at xxi.
76. See Jane Waldfogel, Family & Medical Leave: Evidence from the 2000 Surveys,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 2001, at 17. The gap between leave policies in covered employers and
those in noncovered employers did narrow a bit. Id. at 18-19. Reported ease of administration
declined significantly, but a vast majority reported no noticeable negative effect on business
productivity, profitability, or growth. Id. at 19. The same proportion of private-sector workers, just
under half, had access to FMLA leave. Id. at 20. Nearly an identical proportion of employees took
leave for an FMLA-covered reason, although that reason shifted a bit from the employee's own
serious health needs to caring for a new child or caring for an ill child, spouse, or parent. Id. The
vast majority of those who could have but did not take FMLA leave was due to the fact that it was
unpaid. Id And while more women than men took leave, that gap shrunk a bit, and the rates at
which men and women took time off to care for a new child were almost even. Id. at 21.
77. Comment request, 76 Fed. Reg. 32991-92 (June 7, 2011)
78. See, e.g., VICTORIA LIPNIC & PAUL DECAMP, DEP'T OF LABOR, FAMILY AND MEDICAL
LEAVE ACT REGULATIONS: A REPORT ON THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S REQUEST FOR
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2007, the Department estimated that awareness of the availability of
FMLA leave had increased and as a result, its use had also increased
slightly since the earlier surveys. Overall, employees were grateful for
the leave, although at least some desired expanded benefits, for example:
paid leave, a longer period of leave, and/or leave to care for additional
family members, including same sex spouses, in some states, or
nonmarital same sex partners.so Employers reported few problems with
caregiver leave, but expressed frustration with unscheduled intermittent
leave taken by employees with chronic health conditions. 8 ' They also
documented ways that accommodating this group created the greatest
costs, quantifiable and unquantifiable, to business even though the size
of the group itself was small.82 In addition, the overlap with the
protections of Americans with Disabilities Act for employees with
chronic health conditions added to the administrative demands on
This issue has been labeled the "Absence Abuse"
employers.
problem.84
E. Post-FMLA Issues: PaidLeave and FMLA Compliance
While the Family and Medical Leave Act created a basic structure
that expanded opportunities for workers to be both workers and
caregivers, and began to dismantle some stereotypes linking sex and
caregiving, it does not serve many workers well because either they are
not covered or the leave it provides is unpaid. Some states have begun
to try to fill the gaps there. Some states cover smaller employers, 86 some
INFORMATION
45
(2007),
available
at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1320&context-keyworkplace.
79. Id. at ii (estimating that between 8 and 17.1 percent of covered and eligible workers took
leave in 2005).
80. Id. at iv.
81. Id. at iv-vi, viii.
82. Id. at ix-xii.
83. Id. at ix-x.
84. See e.g., Absence Abuse and Medical Leave, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
http://www.uschamber.com/issues/labor/absence-abuse-and-medical-leave
(last visited Feb. 3,
2013).
85. It appears that up to 26 percent of covered employers also do not provide the leave the
FMLA requires. KENNETH MATOS & ELLEN GALINSKY, FAMILIES & WORK INST., 2012 NATIONAL
at
17
(2012),
available
OF
EMPLOYERS
6,
STUDY

http://familiesandwork.org/site/research/reports/NSE_2012_.pdf.
86. Five states, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, and Vermont along with the District
of Columbia provide family and medical leave to workers at workplaces with fifty or fewer
employees. NAT'L PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, EXPECTING BETrER: A STATE-BYSTATE ANALYSIS OF LAWS THAT HELP NEW PARENTS 49 (2012), available at
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extend leave to workers with less time on the job, and some have an
expanded definition of family." Some states even provide a way for the
leave to be partially paid. In nine states and the District of Columbia,
workers whose employers provide sick leave must be allowed to use that
sick leave to care for at least some family members. 89 Connecticut and
the District of Columbia require employers to provide paid sick leave for
employees. 90
Three states provide mechanisms for paid family leave: California
(Family Temporary Disability Insurance),9 1 New Jersey, (Temporary
Disability Benefits Law),92 and Washington (Family and Medical Leave
Insurance Act.) 93
Washington's leave insurance system is not
operational because it has not been funded yet. 94 Three more states
cover medical leave, including pregnancy-related leave, through statefunded temporary disability insurance: 9 5 Hawaii Temporary Disability

http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/ParentalLeaveReportMay05.pdf?doclD=l 052.
Another nine, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Montana, New
Hampshire, and Washington require that smaller employers provide the same kind of leave for
pregnancy-related absences only. Id.
87. Seven states, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, and
Wisconsin, plus the District of Columbia mandate family and medical leave for employees who
work less than is required for the FMLA. Id. Another seven, California, Iowa, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, and Washington mandate leave for workers who worked
fewer hours, but only for leave related to pregnancy. Id.
88. Nine states-California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont,
Washington, and Wisconsin-and the District of Columbia Id
89. Id. In Minnesota, an employee may only use sick leave in the case of his or her own
illness or injury, or that of a child. Id. Eight other states (California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine,
Maryland, Oregon, and Wisconsin plus the District of Columbia) allow its use for more close
relatives. Id.
90. Id.
91. S.B. 1661, ch. 901, 2002 Legis. Serv. (Cal. 2002); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 3300-03
(West 2011); see also Natalie Koss, The California Family Temporary Disability Insurance
Program, 11 Am. U. J. GENDER & SOC. POL'Y & THE L. 1079, 1079 (2003) (describing the
legislation).
92. N.J. STAT. ANN § 43:21-25 (West 2011).
93. WASH. REV. CODE §49.86.005-.903 (West 2011).
94. The Joint Task Force on Family Leave Insurance issued a fractured report in 2008, with
the majority recommending that funding come from the state's general fund. JOINT TASK FORCE ON
FAMILY

LEAVE

INSURANCE,

FINAL

REPORT

4-8

(2008),

available

at

http://www.leg.wa.gov/JointCommittees/FLI/Documents/FinalReport.pdf
The legislature has
delayed implementation, and there are currently competing proposals to repeal the insurance
program entirely and to expand and fund it similarly to the California and New Jersey plans. Chris
West, Bill Would Repeal State's Family Leave Act, THE CAPITOL RECORD (Jan. 28, 2013),
http://capitolrecord.tvw.org/2013/01/bill-would-repeal-states-family-leave-act/#.UQxAaROOWSo.
95.

EMP'T & TRAINING ADMIN., DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT

INSURANCE
LAWS,
8-1
to
8-9
(2012),
available
http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdfluilawcompar/2012/disability.pdf.
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Insurance, 6 New York State Disability Insurance, and Rhode Island
Temporary Disability Insurance.98
Puerto Rico also has a
commonwealth-funded temporary disability insurance plan. 99
Despite these developments for caregiving and medical leave,
significant calls for improvement remain because so many employees
remain unable to take advantage of it.' 00 Only nine percent of employers
offered fully paid maternity leave in 2012, and eleven percent of
working fathers or non-birth mothers in the private sector have access to
paid leave to care for a new child.'o' Low-wage workers were the least
likely to have access to any sort of paid leave and were least able to take
advantage of the unpaid leave under the FMLA.'0 2
Additionally, while the statute may be helping to legitimize taking
family and medical leave by both sexes, progress does not seem to have
translated into more people taking leave, and it has not always translated
into making leave acceptable. 0 3 Family and medical leave were
purposely framed in a gender-neutral manner as a way to promote sex
equality.104 The framers of the law saw allowing leave regardless of
96. HAW. REV. STAT. § 392-21 (1993). The insurance program provides partial wage
insurance for the employee's own non-work-related sickness or injury and includes pregnancy.
About Temporary Disability Insurance, HAWAI.GOv, http://labor.hawaii.gov/dcd/home/about-tdi/
(last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
97. N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. Law §§ 200-42 (McKinney 2006); About Disability Benefits,
N.Y. STATE INS. FUND, http://ww3.nysif.com/DisabilityBenefits/AboutDisabilityBenefits.aspx (last
visited Jan. 31, 2013).
98. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-39-1 to 28-41-33 (2003). Pregnancy is treated like any other
condition that temporarily disables a worker from working. Temporary Disability Insurance
TRAINING,
DEP'T
OF
LABOR
&
Asked
Questions,
R.I.
Frequently
http://www.dlt.ri.gov/tdi/tdifaqs.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2012).
99. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 11, § 210 (2009).
100. See generally Jennifer Ludden, FMLA Not Really Working for Many Employees, NAT'L
PUB. RADIO (Feb. 5, 2013, 3:24 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/02/05/171078451/fmla-not-reallyworking-for-manyemployees?utmsource-npr&utm medium=facebook&utm campaign=20130205.
101. EXPECTING BETTER, supra note 86, at 11. The number of employers who offered paid
maternity leave had fallen from sixteen percent in 2008 and twenty-seven percent in 1998. Id.
102. Id. at 12. There appears to be a relatively high level of dissatisfaction among employers
and at least some employees about coworkers taking FMLA leave-at least intermittent leave.
LIPNIC & DECAMP, supra note 78, at 47. In situations of intermittent leave with no advance notice,
employees more often have to cover the work of their absent coworkers. Id. Depending how the
employer covers the work of the missing employee, the same may be true of planned leave for long
blocks of time. Id.
103. See Waldfogel, supra note 76, at 17 (reporting that in 2000, statistics about rates of leave
takers had not changed very much). The data from 2000 are a bit out of date, and it is possible that
a new survey would show different rates.
104. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728-37 (2003) (finding that
caregiver leave was designed this way to disrupt the effects of gender stereotypes); see also
Coleman v. Ct. App. Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1339-49 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining
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gender as a way to break down gendered associations in two ways.
First, by expanding who is encouraged to engage in caregiving, and
second by encouraging workers to take leaves for all of their serious
illnesses or injuries.105
Expanding caregivers was viewed as an important way to break
down the association between caregiving and sex.
Caregiving
traditionally has been viewed as women's work, and women viewed as
naturally nurturing. o0 By giving all workers leave and job protection,
men would be encouraged to engage in more caregiving, and the more
caregiving they did, the less caregiving would be associated with either
sex.1 0 7 Additionally, special rules were built in to promote sex equality
in caregiving for older adults. The FMLA allowed leave only to care for
one's own parent or grandparent, not a spouse's parent or grandparent. 08
Thus, women couldn't necessarily be the default caregivers of older
family members in their extended family.109
Second, women were viewed as more physically fragile and as
having greater need for leave because of pregnancy, birth, and
recovery."l0 By encouraging men to take leave for their own serious
illnesses and injuries, the policy would show how men and women were
similar in their vulnerabilities to illness or injury and temporary inability
to work."'
Additionally, historical developments had shown that
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of pregnancy had reinforced
views that women were more expensive to employ and less committed
to work.1 2 Men taking leave in greater numbers would help dilute that
view.
The perceptions the activists sought to disrupt had real economic
consequences for women. Perceptions of women as naturally nurturing
hindered their ability to pursue jobs that were thought to involve
aggression, conflict, competition, or risk.1 3 Women themselves seemed
how the self-care provisions were also designed to disrupt patterns of sex discrimination).
105. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737; Lenhoff& Withers, supranote 60 at 49-50.
106. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729, 731; Lenhoff & Withers, supra note 60, at 49.
107. Lenhoff & Withers, supra note 60, at 49-50; see also Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730-34
(alternating between an explanation of how lack of leave for fathers discriminated against men and
how it reinforced stereotypes of women).
108. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(7) (2006) (defining parent to be a biological parent or person who
stood in loco parentis of the employee when the employee was a child); 29 U.S.C. §2612 (2006).
109. Lenhoff & Withers, supranote 60 at 50.
110. See Coleman v. Ct. App. Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1347-48 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(summarizing testimony before Congress).
111. See id, at 1348-49 (Ginsburg., J., dissenting); Lenhoff& Withers, supra note 60, at 49.
112. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct., at 1341-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
113. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (involving promotion to a
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to choose certain career paths and kinds of jobs, those that were female
dominated already and generally lower paying, because they were or
believed they would be primarily responsible for caregiving, and thought
those kinds of careers and jobs would allow more flexibility.1 4 The pay
and achievement gap for women, whether a result of choices or
discrimination, made women in heterosexual couples who could afford it
the more likely partner to take caregiving leave or quit working
entirely." 5 This reinforced the perception that caregiving was women's
work and that women were not committed workers." 6
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND THE CURRENT DEBATES: CAREGIVER
DISCRIMINATION, NURSING MOTHERS, AND WOMEN'S HEALTH

Despite the fact that family and medical leave legislation has been
framed in a gender neutral manner, leave, people's attitudes towards it,
and people's attitudes towards caregiving remain fairly gendered.'" 7
Moreover, amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act, the
newly enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and women's
health issues generally are causing renewed debate about what equal
treatment requires when men and women in the aggregate are different

traditionally male position that required a level of assertiveness); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) (involving a pattern and practice claim that Sears kept women out of
commission sales jobs, a claim the EEOC lost).
114. Pamela M. Frome et al., Why Don't They Want a Male-DominatedJob? An Investigation
of Young Women Who Changed Their Occupational Aspirations, 12 EDUC. RES. & EVALUATION
359, 365 (2006), availableat http://www.rcgd.isr.umich.edu/garp/articles/frome06.pdf
115. See E. Jeffrey Hill et al., Studying "Working Fathers": Comparing Fathers' and
Mothers' Work-Family Conflict, Fit, and Adaptive Strategies in a Global High-Tech Company, 23
FATHERING 239, 252 tbl. 2 (reporting that among employees worldwide in 2001, 8%of fathers said
they had taken unpaid family leave, while 49% of mothers had; 39% of fathers said they would in
the future, while 55% of mothers said they would); see generally ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF
MOTHERHOOD 52-53, 87-92 (2001).
116.

See id.
See ELLEN GALINSKY ET AL., FAMILIES & WORK INST., 2008 NATIONAL STUDY OF THE
CHANGING WORKFORCE: TIMES ARE CHANGING: GENDER AND GENERATION AT WORK AND AT

117.

HOME 9-21 (rev. Aug. 2011), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/04/Womenin-the-Workplace.pdf (reporting significantly changing roles in caregiving and changing attitudes
towards gender roles in caregiving, but a continuing substantial minority, 39% in 2008, endorse
traditional gender roles); EILEEN PATTEN & KIM PARKER, PEW SOCIAL & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS,
A

GENDER

REVERSAL

ON

CAREER

ASPIRATIONS

7

(2012),

available

at

http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/04/Women-in-the-Workplace.pdf (reporting that while
the public was generally supportive of women having more active roles in the workplace, a
substantial minority of 37% said that the trend of mothers of small children working outside of the
home was a bad thing for society; only 38 % said it hadn't made a difference; and only 21 % saw it
as a good thing).
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from each other.
A. Caregiveror Family ResponsibilitiesDiscrimination
Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Family
Medical Leave Act would seem to prohibit most discrimination against
women who are pregnant or nursing, or against anyone who has
caregiving responsibilities for a parent, child, or spouse. Title VII, as
amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, clearly prohibits
terminating, demoting, harassing, or otherwise discriminating against an
employee because of her pregnancy or a condition related to
pregnancy. 8 It also requires employers to treat pregnancy the same as
they do other temporary disabilities and to provide men and women the
same terms, conditions, and privileges of employment, including fringe
benefits."19 The FMLA requires covered employers to provide unpaid
leave to men and women to care for a new child or close family member
with a serious health need and prohibits employers from retaliating
against employees who seek or take the leave, and from interfering with
employee rights to take the leave.120 It also provides protection for
pregnant employees who take leave to recover from and treat pregnancy
complications.121 The ADA supplements these statutes to add even more
protection by requiring employers to accommodate temporary health
conditions that substantially limit major life activities.' 22 This clearly
covers complications that may arise from pregnancy or birth, but also
may cover limitations that a healthy pregnancy may cause.' 2 3 Despite
the ADA's apparent coverage of significant discrimination against
pregnant women and caregivers of both sexes, discrimination motivated
by sex stereotypes has grown.
118. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(k).
119. See id; see also Cal. Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987)
(affirming that Congress intended the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to be "a floor beneath which
pregnancy disability benefits may not drop-not a ceiling above which they may not rise" and thus it
does not prohibit employment practices favoring pregnant women); Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983) (finding that discrimination against female spouses in
the provision of fringe benefits is also discrimination against spouses of male employees).
120. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612, 2615 (2006).
121. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2006).
122. See Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as "Disability" and the Amended Americans with
Disabilities Act, 53 B.C. L. REv. 443 (2012) (arguing that since individuals with temporary physical
limitations comparable to pregnancy may now receive ADA accommodations, courts should
conclude that the ADA's goal of accommodating previously excluded persons extends to
pregnancy).
123. See id.
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has seen an
increase in sex discrimination cases that present issues of discrimination
against women and men because of their caregiving activities.124 The
increase prompted the EEOC to issue guidance on caregiver
discrimination in 2007.125 In addition, the EEOC held a public meeting
in February of 2012 on the issues of caregiver and pregnancy
discrimination. 126 Several experts testified and suggested that women
were paying a price for having children, becoming pregnant, and being
perceived as potential mothers.127 Men too were paying a price for
potentially taking on too much caregiving responsibility. 128
Several experts testified about the penalties for workers and the
increasing demands for caregiving. Stephen Benard, a professor of
sociology at Indiana University testified about research demonstrating
that mothers suffered a wage penalty that was due at least in part to
negative stereotypes of mothers.129 Sharon Terman from the Legal Aid
Society-Employment Law Center testified about growing discrimination
against pregnant low-wage workers, especially women of color,
including harassment, termination, forced unpaid leave, denial of even
minimal accommodations such as bathroom breaks or lifting restrictions,
and denial of reinstatement after giving birth.130 Lynn Feinberg from the
124. Testimony of Joan Williams, Professor of Law, UC Hastings Foundation Chair, Director
Center for WorkLife Law, on Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy and Caregiving to the U.S.
at
available
15,
2012),
Comm'n
(Feb.
Opportunity
Equal
Emp't
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/williams.cfm [hereinafter Written Testimony of Joan
Williams] ("The Center for WorkLife Law has documented a nearly 400% increase in caregiver
discrimination suits filed between 1999 and 2008 over the previous decade . . . .").
125.

U.S.

UNLAWFUL

EQUAL

EMP'T

OPPORTUNITY

COMM'N,

DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS

EEOC

ENFORCEMENT

GUIDANCE:

WITH CAREGIVING RESPONSIBILITIES, No.

915.002 (2007), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html; Employer Best Practices for
Workers

with

Caregiving

Responsibilities,

U.S.

EQUAL

EMP'T

OPPORTUNITY

COMM'N,

http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiver-best-practices.html (last updated Jan. 19, 2011);
Questions and Answers about EEOC's Enforcement Guidance on Unlawful Disparate Treatment of
Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda caregiving.html (last updated May 23, 2007). These
documents are currently being evaluated in light of the amendments to the Americans with
Disabilities Act, which became effective January 1, 2009. Id.
126. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, Unlawful Discrimination Based
on Pregnancy and Caregiving Responsibilities Widespread Problem, Panelists tell EEOC, (Feb. 15,
2012), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/2-15-12.cfm.
I27. Id.
128. Id.
129. Unlawful Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers and Workers with Caregiving
Responsibilities, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N (Feb. 15, 2012) (Written Testimony of
available
at
Ind.
Univ.),
of
Sociology,
Benard,
Professor
Dr.
Stephen
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/benard.cfn.
130. Unlawful Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers and Workers with Caregiving
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American Association of Retired Persons testified about the rise in
caregiving of older family members and the way that discrimination
against caregivers of older relatives might differ from that against
caregivers of children.' ' Joan Williams from the Center for WorkLife
Law testified about the way that men who ask for caregiving leave are
discriminated against for violating male gender norms.' 32
Several experts testified about legal developments in the field.
Emily Martin of the National Women's Law Center testified that the
courts had generally been hostile to discrimination claims by pregnant
women because the courts interpreted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
to allow employers to differentiate between on-the-job injuries and offthe-job injuries in disability policies, thus refusing to recognize disparate
impact claims in a pregnancy context, and using the Americans with
Disabilities Act as a reason to excuse employers from accommodating
pregnant workers.13 3 Williams detailed the ways that courts have used a
requirement that a plaintiff provide a comparator (i.e. someone outside
the plaintiffs class who is nonetheless identical to the plaintiff), to
inappropriately limit the applicability of Title VII to caregiver
discrimination cases and other ways in which the courts have seemed to
exhibit the same stereotypes that Title VII, the FMLA and the ADA
were designed to combat.13 4

Responsibilities, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N (Feb. 15, 2012) (Written Testimony of
Dr. Sharon Terman, Senior Staff Attorney, Gender Equity and LGBT Rights Program, Legal Aid
Soc'y - Emp't Law Ctr.), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/terman.cfm.
131. Unlawful Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers and Workers with Caregiving
Responsibilities, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N (Feb. 15, 2012) (Written Testimony of
Lynn Feinberg, Senior Strategic Policy Advisor, Indep. Living/Long-Term Care, AARP Pol'y Inst.),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/feinberg.cfm.
132. Unlawful Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers and Workers with Caregiving
Responsibilities, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N (Feb. 15, 2012) (Written Testimony of
Joan Williams, Professor of Law, UC Hastings Found. Chair, Dir. Ctr. for WorkLife Law),
available at http://www.ecoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/williams.cfm; see also Joan C. Williams,
Robin, Devaux, Patricija Petrac & Lynn Feinberg, ProtectingFamily Caregiversfrom Employment
Discrimination,
AARP
PUB.
POL'Y
INST.
(August
2012),
http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/public policyinstitute/health/protectingcaregivers-employment-discrimination-insight-AARP-ppi-tc.pdf. Joan Williams and the Center for
Worklife Law at UC Hastings have been particularly instrumental in identifying discrimination
against caregivers and by showing how that discrimination violates Title VIl. For some examples of
their efforts, see Publications, WORKLIFE LAW, http://worklifelaw.org/frd/ (last visited Feb. 3,
2013) (click "Publications" and expand titles under "Family Responsibilities Discrimination").
133. Unlawful Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers and Workers with Caregiving
Responsibilities, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N (Feb. 15, 2012) (Written Testimony of
Emily Martin, Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Women's Law Ctr.), available at
http://www.ecoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/martin.cfm.
134. Testimony of Joan Williams, supra note 124; see also JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING
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Others focused their remarks on efforts for reform or on
clarifications of how the overlapping laws in this area interact. Maryann
Parker of the Service Employee International Union testified that unions
could help protect women, particularly low-wage workers, by improving
their work environment generally, helping to enforce their legal rights,
and by helping employers tailor compliance to the needs of the particular
workplace.' 35 Deane Ilukowicz from Hypertherm, a manufacturing
company, testified that although her company had won awards for its
work environment and worker-supportive policies, the patchwork of
laws that govern employer conduct in this area, laws which are enforced
by different agencies, leaves employers with little guidance on how to
comply. 136 Judith Lichtman, from the National Partnership for Women
and Families, advocated for ways in which the agencies could work
together. 13 7
For instance, all the agencies should enter into a
memorandum of understanding to coordinate efforts related to caregiver
discrimination; the EEOC should update its guidance and make
caregiving discrimination a litigation priority; the Department of Labor's
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs should update its
regulations, unchanged since 1978, and prioritize enforcement of these
cases. 13 8 Lichtman also urged the Department of Labor's Wage and
Hour Division to implement the recommendations from its surveys on
the FMLA and publicize the new right to breaks for nursing mothers
enacted under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.139
Liebman also calls for the Department of Justice and Office of Personnel

GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 1-2, 14-15 (2000);
Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination
Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 150, 167 (1989) (noting
that limitations are evident in recent Title Vil Supreme Court decisions which could be avoided if
the Court were to "require that legislation neither be based upon nor promote or perpetuate
social/cultural constructs of gender.").
135. Unlawful Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers and Workers with Caregiving
Responsibilities, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N (Feb. 15, 2012) (Written Testimony of
Maryann Parker, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Serv. Emp. Int'l Union), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/parker.cfm.
136. Unlawful Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers and Workers with Caregiving
Responsibilities, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N (Feb. 15, 2012) (Written Testimony of
Deane Ilukowicz, Vice President of Human Res., Hypertherm, Inc.), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/ilukowicz.cfm.
137. Unlawful Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers and Workers with Caregiving
Responsibilities, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N (Feb. 15, 2012) (Written Testimony of
Judith L. Lichtman, Senior Advisor, Nat'l P'ship for Women and Families), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/lichtman.cfm.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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Management to ensure that state governments and the federal
government, respectively, operate as model workplaces. 140
B. LactationRooms and Breaks
Women and men are not necessarily similarly situated physically or
socially when it comes to issues surrounding pregnancy, birth, or caring
for a newborn. Thus, it is probably not a surprise that the laws that
prohibit sex discrimination have not necessarily been considered to
address discrimination against breastfeeding mothers or to require
accommodation of breastfeeding.141 The EEOC's position is that
discrimination against women who are breastfeeding violates Title
VII. 142 That position has not been adopted by most courts that have
considered the situation, however. Most federal courts to have
considered claims under Title VII involving adverse employment actions
taken against women because they were breastfeeding or refusals to
allow breastfeeding women to express milk found that the actions were
not discrimination on the basis of sex. 143 Much of the reasoning in these
cases echoes that of the Supreme Court in Geduldig v. Aiello.'" Even
though only women can breastfeed, non-breastfeeders include both men
and women, and in these cases, there were no similarly situated men
who could be said to have been treated better. 145 The language of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act was no help; lactation happens after
pregnancy and childbirth and is a normal bodily function rather than a
"medical condition related to pregnancy or childbirth."1 46
140. Id.
141. The Family and Medical Leave Act would not prohibit discrimination on the basis of
breastfeeding or accommodation to enable breastfeeding unless the discrimination or
accommodation involved a leave request. The Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 1033, 107 Stat. 10 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (Supp. V 2006)). The Americans with
Disabilities Act likely does not reach the issue, either, because breastfeeding itself is not necessarily
an impairment of a major life activity, although complications like mastitis, a breast infection, might
rise to that level. Nicole Kennedy Orozco, Note, Pumping at Work: Protectionfrom Lactation
Discrimination in the Workplace, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1281,1298 n.117 (2010).
142. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 7-8, EEOC v. Houston Funding Ltd., II, 2013 WL
2360114, at *4 (5th Cir. May 30, 2013)(finding "the EEOC has stated a primafacie case of sex
discrimination with a showing that Houston Funding fired Venters because she was lactating and
wanted to express milk at work.").
143. See Orozco, supra note 141, at 1303-07.
144. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494-497 (1974).
145. See Orozco, supranote 141, at 1306.
146. See id.; see also Puente v. Ridge, No. M-04.267, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46624, at *1112 (S.D. Tex. July 6, 2005); Martinez v. NBC Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1999);
Jacobson v. Regent Assisted Living, Inc., No. CV-98-564-ST, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7680, at *30
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Although discrimination claims have not been wholly successful
under Title VII, some employees have protections under state law. Six
states and the District of Columbia explicitly prohibit discrimination
against women who breastfeed or who are lactating.14 7 In addition,
twenty-three states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico either
require employers to provide reasonable breaks and a clean, private
space to express milk for women who are lactating or prohibit
discrimination against women who use their breaks for this purpose. 148
Federal law does provide some explicit support for nursing
mothers. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act amended the
Fair Labor Standards Act to require employers to provide a nursing
mother who is not exempt from the overtime provisions reasonable
break time and facilities to express milk for one year after her child's
birth.14 9 Employers with fewer than fifty employees do not have to
comply if compliance would be significantly difficult or expensive
considering the size, financial resources, nature, or structure of the
(D. Or. Apr. 9, 1999); Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Ky. 1990).
147. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.5-104 (2008 & Supp. 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-34b
(West 2011); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.82 (2011 & Supp. 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (2011); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 604 (2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-215 (2011); N.Y. LAB. LAW §
206-c (McKinney 2011); see also Orozco, supra note 141, at 1296-97 (noting that while some states
have a simple prohibition on discrimination against mothers who express milk in the workplace,
other states have more specific and extensive provisions such as prohibiting adverse employment
action and the like).
148. These jurisdictions and the relevant statutes include: Arkansas (ARK. CODE. ANN. § 11-5116 (2009)); California (CAL. LAB. CODE § 1030 (West 2011)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 813.5-101-104 (2008 & Supp. 2012)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-40w (West 2012));
District of Columbia (D.C. CODE § 2-1402.82 (2011)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-6 (2008));
Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 367-3, 378-2 (2011)); Illinois (820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 260 (2011));
Indiana (IND. CODE §§ 5-10-6-2 (public employers only), 22-2-14-2 (2008); Maine (ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 604 (2009)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. § 181.939 (2010)); Mississippi (MIss. CODE
ANN. § 71-1-55 (2006)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-215 (2011)); New Mexico (N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 28-20-2 (West 2007)); New York (N.Y. LAB. LAW § 206-c (McKinney 2011));
Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 435 (2010)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. §653.077 (2007)); Puerto
Rico (P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 3, § 1466 (3) (2007), P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 478a (2009)); Rhode
Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-13.2-1 (2008)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-305
(2008)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 305 (2008 & Supp. 2012)). Three states, North Dakota,
Texas, and Washington, do not mandate leave or prohibit discrimination by employers, but instead
allow employers to market themselves as infant or mother friendly if they provide breaks and
facilities or other policies to support lactating employees. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-12-17 (2012);
TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 165.003 (West 2011 & Supp. 2012); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 43.70.640 (West 2011).
149. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r) (2006 & Supp. V 2007-2012). The leave time need not be paid unless
an employer provides pay for other similar breaks. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(2) (2006 & Supp. V. 20072012); WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #73: BREAK TIME FOR NURSING
available
at
FLSA,
(Dec.
2010),
MOTHERS
UNDER
THE
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs73.pdf
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business.so The Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division
enforces this statute, and while employees are protected by the FLSA
against retaliation, it does not appear that they have a private cause of
action to enforce the provision."'
C. Reproductive Health, Title VII, and the PatientProtection and
Affordable Care Act's ContraceptiveMandate
As the discussion surrounding pregnancy and caregiving shows,
issues related to women's reproductive systems are not always seen as
issues equality theory can address because women and men are viewed
as differently situated. For some time, there have been questions about
whether Title VII requires employers who provided prescription
coverage as part of their health insurance plans to provide coverage for
contraception for women.152 Those questions arose with new vigor with
the enactment of the Affordable Care Act's provisions which mandated
coverage of women's reproductive health and the Health and Human
Services Secretary's determination that prescription contraception had to
be included as part of that coverage.15 3
The only highly effective contraception that women alone can

150. 29 U.S.C. §207(r)(3)(2006 & Supp. V 2007-2012).
151. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 211, 217 (2012)(conceming enforcement by the Wage and Hour
Division). The FLSA provides for a cause of action to recover unpaid compensation, but since there
is no compensation or other penalty necessarily connected with the leave time, it is not clear that
this action will lie for a violation of the break time provision. See 29 U.S.C. §216(b); Reasonable
Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,073, 80,078 (Dep't of Labor Dec. 21, 2010); see
also Salz v. Casey's Mktg. Co., No. 11-CV-3055-DEO, 2012 WL 2952998,
at *3 (N.D. Iowa July 19, 2012).
152. See generally Allison L. Cantrell, Comment, Weaving PrescriptionBenefit Plans into the
Birds and the Bees Talk: How an Employer-Provided Insurance Plan that Denies Coverage for
Prescription Contraception is Sex Discrimination Under Title VII as Amended by the ADA, 39
CUMB. L. REv. 239 (2009).
153. According to an article in the New York Times, dozens of suits have been filed
challenging the mandate on the grounds that contraception generally violates the employer's
freedom of conscience, or coverage for contraception considered to be an abortifacient violates the
employer's freedom of conscience. Ethan Bronner, A Flood of Suits on the Coverage of Birth
Control, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2013, at Al. The courts are split on whether the coverage mandate
violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. E.g., Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2012 WL
6757353 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012) (granting preliminary injunction because mandate unlikely to be
narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., v.
Sebelius, No. 12-6294, 2012 WL 6930302 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (holding that plaintiff's rights
to conscience were not substantially burdened upon by the mandate); O'Brien v. U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., No. 12-3357, 2012 WL 4481208 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2012) (granting a
stay pending appeal of the district court's holding that the mandate did not violate RFRA, thus
granting temporary relief from the HHS mandate).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2013

25

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 2
334

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 30:309

control is only available by prescription.' 54 Thus, refusing to cover
contraception when other drugs are covered affects women in a way
unique to their sex, just like pregnancy. The ability to become pregnant
or potential pregnancy may be a medical condition related to pregnancy
within the meaning of Title VII,'" but courts are split on the issue.156
Infertility may be thought to fall even more clearly into the
"medical condition related to pregnancy" language, but the courts have
generally held that denial of insurance coverage for infertility treatment
is not a violation of Title VII."' Both men and women can suffer from
fertility problems, and the treatment may at times be the same regardless
of whether male or female infertility causes an inability to conceive. 5 1
Where an adverse employment action is taken against a female
employee because of sex-specific infertility treatment, however, the
employer has likely violated Title VII.15 9 In that situation, the employer
is motivated by a medical condition related to pregnancy for that
particular woman.
D. The Labor and Employee Rights Legislative Agenda for Reform
When President Obama first took office, the labor and employment
community foresaw big reforms in employment and labor law. On the
agenda was legislation to make organizing and collective bargaining
easier,160 proposals to extend antidiscrimination protection to sexual
orientation and identity' 6 1 and to extend family and medical leave to

154. See OFFICE OF WOMEN'S HEALTH, FED. DRUG ADMIN., BIRTH CONTROL GUIDE (Aug.
at
available
2012),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ByAudience/ForWomen/FreePublications/UCM282
014.pdf. Spermicide is available over the counter, but it has a 28 percent failure rate. Id. at 9.
Relatively recently, two new contraceptives have been approved for use without a prescription.
Female condoms are available without a prescription, but they have a 21 percent failure rate. Id. at
5. Plan B, with a 13% failure rate, also prevents ovulation and may prevent implantation of an
embryo after unprotected sex are available over the counter. Id. at 16. None of these are as
effective as birth control pills taken daily, estrogen and progestin delivered via patch or cervical
ring, shots or implanted rods that release progestin, or Intra-Uterine Devices. See id. at 10-20.
155. See Int'l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 198-99 (1991) (holding that
the potential to become pregnant falls within the language of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act).
156. See Cantrell, supra note 152 at 244-245 (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in
GeneralElectric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)).
157. See, e.g., Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 349 (2d Cir. 2003).
158. See id at 347; Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1996).
159. See Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 647-48 (7th Cir. 2008).
160. See Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 560, 11Ith Cong.
(2009).
161. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act, S. 1584, 11Ith Cong. (2009); H.R. 3017,
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same sex partners and other family members,162 various other extensions
of family and medical leave, 63 and mandated breaks and facilities plus
anti-discrimination protections for lactating women.164
What was enacted was more modest and narrower. We saw
extensions of leave provisions but only to members of the military and
their families. 6 5 Health care reform mandated breaks and facilities for
lactating women to express milk, but no legislation provided a real
increase in funding to support childcare.166 The Executive Branch also
111th Cong. (2009).
162. See Family and Medical Leave Inclusion Act, H.R. 2132, 11Ith Cong. (2009).
163. Some bills extended coverage to more people or for more reasons. See Military Family
Leave Act of 2009, H.R. 3257, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1441, 111th Cong. (2009) (providing two
weeks of leave each year for each family member (spouse, child or parent) of the employee who is
in the military and either receives notification of an impending call or order to active duty, or who is
deployed in connection with a contingency operation); Family and Medical Leave Enhancement
Act, H.R. 824, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1440, 112th Cong. (2011) (expanding FMLA to allow
leave for child's educational and extracurricular activities, to attend to routine family medical needs
and to assist elderly relatives, to cover employers who employ 25 or more employees, to permit
substitution of accrued vacation, personal or sick leave for FMLA leave, and to require seven days'
notice or "as much notice as is practicable" in order to use the FMLA leave); Domestic Violence
Leave Act, H.R. 2515, 111th Cong. (2009), H.R. 3151, 112th Cong. (2011) (extending FMLA to
allow leave to address domestic violence, sexual assault or stalking and their effects).
Other bills would have provided for paid leave. See Healthy Families Act, H.R. 2460, 11lth Cong.
(2009); S. 1152, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1876, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 984, 112th Cong. (2011)
(requiring employers with at least fifteen employees who work at least thirty hours a week to
provide up to seven days of paid sick leave for care of family members and other individuals
"whose close association with the employee is the equivalent of a family relationship"); Pandemic
Protection for Workers, Families, and Businesses Act, H.R. 4092, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 2790,
111th Cong. (2009) (providing for seven days of paid sick time, pro rata for part time workers, for
care related to a contagious illness); Emergency Influenza Containment Act, H.R. 3991, 111th
Cong. (2009) (providing five days of paid leave for employees directed to stay home by employer
because of contagious disease and prohibiting retaliation); Family Leave Insurance Act of 2009,
H.R. 1723, 111th Cong. (2009) (creating a federal insurance benefits fund administered by the
Secretary of Labor and funded equally by employees and employers, each paying .2 percent of
annual earnings to the fund to provide employees with twelve weeks of paid family and medical
leave).
Still other legislative proposals would have combined the two. Balancing Act, H.R. 3047, 111th
Cong. (2009); H.R. 2346, 112th Cong. (2011) (expanding coverage to smaller employers, providing
paid leave, expanding reasons for taking leave, expanding relationships of people leave can be taken
for, expanding child care and school assistance programs, and creating a pilot program to encourage
teleworking).
164. See The Breastfeeding Promotion Act, S. 1244, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2819, 111th
Cong. (2009).
165. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 565,
123 Stat. 2190, 2309 (2009). For a summary of the leave provisions, see GERALD MAYER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., No. R42758, THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT (FMLA): AN OvERVIEW
(2012),
available
at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.comell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1965&context=keyworkplace.
166. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 577-78
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created a task force focused on raising the living and working standards
for middle class families.16 President Obama has been active with his
executive order powers, enhancing data collection on women conducted
by the White House Council on Women and Girls,16 1itself a creation of
the President.169
IV. CONCLUSION: EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY, A WAY FORWARD

This brief history, even with all of the legislation and court
decisions, shows that we have not progressed very far in addressing
inequality in contexts where we think people are different. We have
difficulty critically assessing whether the standard against which we
measure is something we should retain. We continue to define the
workplace according to idealized male norms, norms that posit the ideal
worker as able to work for long consecutive hours, with little notice,
never needing leave, able to perform the same tasks until retirement. It
doesn't matter that actual men can rarely meet this standard.
Perhaps the way forward is to work on two fronts, one social and
one legal. On the social front, keep working to redefine gender roles and
to recast the debates to not make one sex (or class or race or ability
level) the norm against which an ideal is measured. The way that the
debate over contraceptive coverage in the health reform legislation was
reframed provides a good example. Contraception, abortion, and forced
sterilization have, since the 1970s, been framed in rights terms.170
Scholars and activists have sometimes used an equality framework, but
that, too, has tended to focus on rights.' 7' Activists have at least tried to
(2010) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 207(r) (Supp. II 2010)).
167. See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, White House
Task Force on Middle-Class Working Families, 74 Fed. Reg. 5979 (Feb. 3, 2009) available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-02-03/pdf/E9-2436.pdf (defining the mission to make
recommendations on how to expand education and lifelong training, improve work family balance,
restore labor standards, protect incomes, and protect retirement security).
168. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Enhanced
Collection of Relevant Data and Statistics Relating to Women, 76 Fed. Reg. 12,823 (Mar. 9, 2011),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-03-09/pdf/2011-5568.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE & ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, WOMEN IN AMERICA: INDICATORS OF SOCIAL AND

ECONOMIC

WELL-BEING

(2011),

available

at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss-viewer/Women-inAmerica.pdf.
169. Exec. Order No. 13,506, 74 Fed. Reg. 11,271 (Mar. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-03-16/pdf/E9-5802.pdf.
170. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (framing mandatory
pregnancy leave as an issue of substantive due process and fundamental rights).
171.

See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and Soul: Equality, Pregnancy,and the UnitaryRight to

Abortion, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 329 (2010) (discussing the benefits and pitfalls of equality
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reframe the issue in the healthcare reform context as a matter of
women's health.17 2 By defining women's health to include control over
reproduction, choosing to have children or not to have children,
controlling the number and spacing of those children, the activists have
had some success of getting beyond the problem of clashing rights. And
because healthcare reform created larger pools, spreading risk among
larger groups, it becomes easier to focus on the group in the aggregate
(both men and women) rather than particular subsets of the larger group.
The second front is the legal front. On the legal front, reform
advocates should focus less on the coercive model of the antidiscrimination norm, less on rights, and look to other models of
improving women's lives, models that reach across identity categories.
Income security connected with leave, possibly funded by a payroll tax
system or a deferred compensation system, would help employees with
caregiving responsibilities in the same way that disability insurance
provides some help for employees who can't work because of their own
serious health problems. The availability of paid leave might allow
more men to take leave than those that currently do, speeding up the
process of breaking the link between gender and caregiving. It would
also better support single parents, most of whom are women, who may
be in particular danger of sliding into poverty if forced to stop working,
and it may better reach low wage workers.
As the review of recent legislation and developments in the states
shows, we have already stepped partially down these paths. I think we
should keep going.

arguments about reproductive issues and proposing a relational model to reframe the liberty issues).
172. Id. at 339.
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